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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
REX L. COLE and HELGA S. COLE, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
FRANK J. PARKER, LIZZIE PARK-
ER, HAROLD V. PARKER, and 
JUANITA PARKER, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
8340 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The parties will be referred to as in the Court below. 
All italics are ours. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
BY RESPONDENTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN 
FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO FRAUD ON 
THE PART OF THE DEFENDANTS. 
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POINT II. 
THAT THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE WAIVED 
ANY RIGHTS TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT 
THEY MIGHT HAVE HAD BY THEIR ACTS 
AND CONDUCT. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR AND WAS 
JUSTIFIED IN FORFEITING THE SUM OF 
$11,600.00 PAID ON THE CONTRACT BY THE 
PLAINTIFFS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN 
FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO FRAUD ON 
THE PART OF THE DEFENDANTS. 
Plaintiff's first point as set forth in their appeal i1 
that the evidence establishes fraud on the part of the de· 
fendants, and in support of this point they claim that Harol( 
V. Parker avoided taking Mr. Cole along the route of thl 
creek. This, of course, Mr. Parker denies. Mr. Parke1 
testified (R. 203) "that there were two routes from thi 
ranch to Hen dries Creek. We took him up one and doWl 
the other." But even though Mr. Parker did not retur1 
from the spring to the ranch by another route but cam 
back by the same route, this does not constitute fraud o 
misrepresentation. The undisputed evidence is that M1 
Cole visited the ranch and went over the whole ranch an 
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3 
saw for himself exactly how much water was reaching the 
ranch (R. 55). The evidence is also undisputed that Mr. 
Cole, after looking at the ranch and specifically the amount 
of water reaching the ranch, was taken by Mr. Parker to 
the source of the stream ; that is, the spring at the head of 
Hendries Creek. At this point Mr. Cole saw exactly how 
much water was originating at the source of Hendries 
Greek. Mr. Cole also saw for himself that the major portion 
of the water originating in Hendries Creek was lost by 
percolation before it reached the ranch. When Mr. Parker, 
Mr. Crystal, Mr. Hancock and Mr. Cole were present at the 
source of the water supply there was a conversation con-
cerning the necessity of ways and means of conserving the 
water which was being lost by percolation on its course to 
the ranch. Mr. Hancock, who is a disinterested witness, 
being also a prospective purchaser and who was being 
shown the ranch at the same time it was being shown to 
Mr. Cole, testified as follows (R. 144, 145) : 
"Q. What do you recall Mr. Parker said spe-
cifically about the water? 
"A. That in the spring there is as much as 52 
second feet, that it declines during the year, that 
the water was being lost-a good share of it was 
being lost by running into the ground before it got 
to the ranch-if cement were taken about the first 
mile or so that it would help a lot." 
Mr. Mark Crystal, called as a witness for the defendants, 
testified as follows (R. 155) : 
"Q. Did you have-by you I mean Mr. Cole 
and you and Mr. Parker and Mr. Hancock-did you 
have any discussion about the water situation? 
"A. Yes sir. 
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"Q. Will you state to His Honor and counsel 
the conversation as you remember it that Mr. Parker 
and these gentlemen and you had. 
"A. When we walked over to the creek where 
the water was flowing I observed a clear stream of 
water of 5 or 6 second feet of water. Obviously at 
that particular tin1e we were discussing percolation 
loss of the water where it was running over the 
alluvial fill at the mouth of the canyon. I had men-
tioned at that time that there was a similar situation 
that I was familiar with down in central Utah where 
I had occasion to lead the water over a plot about 
two and a half to three miles from the mouth of a 
canyon down to a reservoir. At that time I stated 
this particular company-this irrigation company-
had contracted having a ditch lined; a concrete and 
beveled ditch, and that had been able to solve their 
loss; that is, prevent the loss of water through per-
colation by the construction of a ditch and cement 
lining it." 
The evidence is conclusive that Mr. Cole did understand 
the true condition of the water supply, and that the water 
varied at different seasons of the year and from year to 
year, and that the major part of the water originating at 
the source was lost by percolation en route to the ranch, 
and that extensive development work was necessary; name-
ly, the cementing of a ditch from the source of Hendries 
Creek to the ranch. 
Now appellants claim that they were misled because 
Mr. Cole was taken from the ranch to the source of the 
water supply and back by the same route, and therefore 
he was prevented from observing that the water was being 
lost by percolation in a hidden fault somewhere en route. 
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Mr. Parker testified that there are two routes from the 
ranch to the source of the water supply and that they went 
up one and down the other (R. 203). If this is not the true 
fact, then it is significant that Mr. Black only attempted 
to prove the contrary by the testimony of Mr. Cole, and did 
not ask either of the disinterested witnesses, Mr. Hancock 
or Mr. Crystal, who were also in the truck and who also 
knew the facts. There is only one fair conclusion to be 
drawn from the record, and that is that Mr. Cole was taken 
from the ranch to the water supply by one route and back 
by the other; and that Mr. Cole saw precisely how much 
water was originating at the source and how much was 
reaching the ranch; that the water was being lost by per-
colation into the ground and that in order to preserve the 
water certain development work was necessary; namely, 
the cementing of the ditch to preserve the water; and that 
the cementing would be about $1.00 per foot. 
Even though there was what counsel terms a hidden 
fault; as testified to by Don Peterson (R. 118), Mr. 
Cole was not misled, because he was advised by Mr. Parker 
and Mr. Crystal that the water was being lost by percola-
tion and exactly what must be done to prevent it. That Mr. 
Cole was not in fact misled by reason of an alleged hidden 
fault is shown by the testimony of Mr. Cole himself (R. 
75): 
"Q. Did you know of your own knowledge 
what the reason is, now? 
"A. Yes. The knowledge that I found out is 
that the water between the ranch and above there 
goes into the gravel." 
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So there is insufficient evidence in the record to establis} 
that the water is lost by reason of a hidden fault, becaust 
Mr. Cole found out by experience that as an actual fad 
the water was being lost in the gravel en route to the ranch 
There is no evidence in the record to substantiate coun. 
sel's claim that Harold Parker misrepresented to Mr. Cole 
the extent of productivity of the ranches. Mr. Harold 
Parker took Mr. Cole over both of the entire ranches and hE 
saw for himself just exactly how much land was under 
cultivation and what crops it had produced, as it was then 
about harvest time (R. 55). 
That the ranches were and had been for many years 
productive is established by the uncontradicted testimony 
of Mr. Parker. Mr. Parker testified that he was married 
and had eight children, and that the family was supported 
from the ranch for the years, 1951, 1949, 1948, 1947, 1946, 
1945 and 1944. Mr. Parker testified that his income tax 
for the year 1951, the year previous to the sale to Mr. Cole, 
showed a net taxable income derived from the Robinson 
ranch of $1,200.00 Mr. Parker had ten exemptions of 
$600.00 each, making the total profit derived from the 
Robinson ranch alone of $7,200.00 after the interest pay-
ments, taxes, depreciation, and the usual farm deductions 
had been made. Mr. Parker also testified that his income 
tax return for the year 1950 showed a taxable income of 
a little better than $1,200.00, and that it was about the same 
for the year 1949 (R. 220 and 230). 
No evidence was introduced as to the income of thE 
Meecham ranch, but the uncontradicted evidence is tha1 
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the income of the Robinson ranch was in excess of $7,200.00 
and with some variation it had been substantially the same. 
The evidence does not sustain counsel's contention that 
the ranches were marginal ground and unproductive. Mr. 
Parker moved onto the Robinson ranch in the year 1937 
(R. 193) and lived on the ranch from then until it was sold 
to Mr. Cole in 1952, with the exception of three years when 
he leased the ranch, and at all times made payments on 
the mortgage and supported his family from the ranch (R. 
194-195). 
Counsel, in support of Point I, argues that various 
courts have agreed that there are subtle ways of being 
deceitful; that the courts have ruled time and time again 
that half-truths are just as dishonest as bold lies, and cites 
the case of Melnoe et al. vs. Dixon et al., 225 P. 2d 273. 
Even if we concede, which we do not, that the case 
cited by counsel stated a true rule of law applicable to this 
case, it is clearly distinguishable. In the case cited by 
counsel, the owner-builder had intentionally and knowingly 
failed to comply with the building requirements and had 
obtained no permits for the building, and they could not 
be obtained because the building was not constructed ac-
cording to the legal requirements. All of these facts were 
positively known to the seller-builder, and knowing of his 
own knowledge that the building requirements had not been 
complied with and that building permits had not been taken 
and could not be obtained, and knowing that the house would 
eventually have to be torn down. The court disposed of 
this case by adopting the language used in the case of 
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Mary Pickford Company vs. Bagley Bros., Inc., 86 P. 2d 
102: 
"If the seller of a security impliedly represents 
that the law had been complied with and that a per-
mit for such sale had been issued, it is to naturally 
follow that if the builder-owner of a house sells such 
house he impliedly represents that the law has been 
complied with." 
Counsel also cites the case of Dyke vs. Zaiser, 182 P. 2d 353: 
"The present tendency is to class concealment 
as actual fraud in those cases where the seller knows 
of facts which materially affect the desirability of 
the property which he knows are unknown to the 
buyers." 
and on Page 275 it says: 
"It is a general rule that a vendor not in a con-
fidential relation to the buyer is not under a duty 
to make full disclosure concerning the object which 
he would sell. However, it is a universally recog-
nized exception that if he undertakes to do so he is 
bound not only to tell the truth but he is equally 
obligated not to suppress or conceal facts within 
his knowledge which materially qualify those stated. 
If he speaks at all he must make a complete and fair 
disclosure." 
In all of the cases cited by counsel there was a conceal-
ment of a material fact. Now, the only concealment of fact 
alleged by counsel is what counsel calls the fatal defect of a 
hidden fault. There is no evidence in the record to prove that 
this so-called hidden fault was in any manner prejudicial to 
the defendant. Before going to the source of the water supply 
Mr. Cole saw for himself just how much water was reaching 
the ranch (R. 55). They then went to the source of Hendries 
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Creek and he saw exactly how much water there was at 
the source, and he saw for himself that the major portion 
of the water was being lost by percolation. There was then 
a discussion as to how the water could be conserved (R. 
144, 145), and everyone understood that the major portion 
of the water was being lost by percolation and that in order 
to conserve the water it was necessary to cement a ditch 
from the source of the supply to the ranch. Whether the 
loss was by percolation into the gravel or was due to a 
hidden fault or an alluvial fill, this fact was well under-
stood; that the water was being lost and the development 
program that was necessary to conserve the water. The 
plaintiff knew at the time the contract was signed that the 
major portion of the water was being lost by percolation, 
either by passing over an alluvial fill, as it was designated 
by the defendant, or by a hidden fault, as it was described 
by Mr. Peterson. So that even though there was a hidden 
fault and the defendant failed to reveal it to the plaintiff, 
the plaintiff was not misled in any manner, for he knew 
that in fact the water was being lost by percolation en route 
to the ranch. 
POINT II. 
THAT THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE WAIVED 
ANY RIGHTS TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT 
THEY MIGHT HAVE HAD BY THEIR ACTS 
AND CONDUCT. 
Even assuming that Mr. Parker concealed and failed 
to mention to Mr. Cole the alleged hidden fault and did in 
fact mislead him about the water supply, the plaintiffs 
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under the facts as they appear in this record are not en-
titled to have the contract rescinded. The rule is stated in 
17 c. J. s. 914: 
"In accordance with the general rule stated in 
Section 431 above, a party desiring to rescind for 
fraud or false representation must do so promptly 
and within a reasonable time, and the right is lost 
by the failure to act in such a time on discovery or 
after it might have been discovered by the use of due 
diligence." 
In Fletcher vs. Wireman, 152 Ky. 565, the court says: 
"The party who claims to have been defrauded 
in the execution of a contract must assert this de-
fense within a. reasonable time after a suit has been 
brought against him to enforce the contract, or with-
in a reasonable time after the fraud was discovered, 
or else he shall be deemed to have waived his right 
to rely on the alleged fraud." 
The same rule is expressed in Century Life Insurance Com-
pany vs. Taylor, 176 Southwestern 373, wherein the court 
says: 
"Where one sues in equity to obtain rescission 
of a contract because his claim to the relief sought 
upon the grounds of fraud induced the execution of 
the contract, he must act promptly in making his 
election of remedies, for if he fails to act promptly 
upon discovery of the fraud he loses his right to 
rescission in equity." 
The rule has been settled in this jurisdiction that the buyer, 
if he is to rescind the contract, must do so within a reason-
able time after the discovery of the alleged fraud. In the 
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case of Fraily vs. McGarry, 211 P. 2d 840 (Utah 1949), 
this court says : 
"After reviewing the record of events as they 
transpired, we find it unnecessary to determine 
whether the defendant, by fraud, induced the plain-
tiff to enter into the contract. The facts present in 
the instant case preclude plaintiff from rescinding 
the contract because of misrepresentation or fraud. 
It is well settled by decisions from this court that 
all persons claiming the right to rescind must, after 
the discovery of the fraud, announce his purpose and 
adhere to it (Taylor vs. Moore, 87 Utah 493, 51 P. 
2d 222). We have also held that the purchaser must 
evidence his intention to rescind by some unequivo-
cal act, either by notice or by some act amounting to 
a notice of intention to rescind (McKellar Real Es-
tate and Investment Co. vs. Paxton, 61 Utah 97, 218 
P. 128). 
"Moreo1Jer, a defrauded party after learning 
the truth will not be permitted to go on deriving 
the benefits from the transaction and later elect to 
rescind (LeVine vs. Whitehouse, 37 Utah 160, 109 
P. 2). 
"The fraud alleged by plaintiff as grounds for 
rescission consist of alleged statement made by the 
defendant that there was ample water available to 
irrigate the 960 acres of farm land, and that it was 
a mere formality to secure the right to drill wells in 
order to obtain the water. The falsity of such state-
ments, if made, was made known to the defendant 
many months before he decided to rescind the con-
tract. He became aware of the fact that there was 
a supposed shortage of water and that it would not 
be a mere formality to receive permission to drill 
wells when he received his first letter from the state 
engineer on March 2, 1946. Yet he did not notify 
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defendant of his intention to rescind until some ten 
months later. Black in his work in rescission and 
cancellation, Section 536, states the rule as follows: 
"'* * * It must be remembered that a con-
tract induced by fraud, false representation, mistake, 
etc., is not void, but merely voidable, and it is en-
tirely within the right of the injured party to affirm 
it or treat it as valid and subsisting. In this respect 
he has a choice or election, and he should not be re-
quired to make his decision instantly. The true 
doctrine is that if discovering the facts justified 
rescission the party is entitled to a reasonable time 
in which to decide upon the course he will take, but 
this does not mean that he will be indulged in a vacil-
lating or hesitating course of conduct, but that he 
must act with such a measure of promptness as 
fairly can be called reasonable with reference to all 
the circumstances of the particular case. Particu-
larly he must, if possible, avoid such delay as will 
make the ensuing rescission injurious to the other 
party. He must use reasonable diligence in ascer-
taining the facts which may entitle him to a re-
scission and must act as soon thereafter the dis-
covery of them so that the opposite party will not be 
unnecessarily prejudiced. The rule is that he who 
would rescind the contract must offer to do so 
promptly upon discovery of the facts that will justify 
a rescission and while he is able of himself or by the 
judgment of the court to place the opposing parties 
substantially in status quo.' " 
Mr. Cole bought the Robinson and Meecham ranches 
on the 13th of August, 1952, and took possession of the 
property and harvested and sold the crops which were then 
on the place; and, as testified to by Mr. Cole, he had de-
termined within two months after the contract was signed 
that he was going to rescind the contract (R. 95). 
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"Q. You didn't make up your mind to rescind 
until December 31? 
"A. No, my mind was made up two months 
after I moved onto the property." 
Two months after the contract was executed Mr. Cole 
had determined to rescind the contract, but did nothing to 
notify the Parkers until December 1, 1953. Mr. Cole har-
vested the crops then on the place and then abandoned the 
property and permitted the trees to die, and made no effort 
to prevent the premises from deterioration. Immediately 
after purchasing the properties he listed them for sale at 
a price in excess of $40,000 (R. 95), the purchase price for 
the properties, and continued to hold possession until De-
cember 31, 1953, thirty days before the next payment was 
due, depriving the Parkers of the use of the properties and 
allowing them to deteriorate, knowing full well that he in-
tended to rescind the contract. By such action and conduct 
by the plaintiffs, they waived all right to rescind the con-
tract, if there had ever been such a right. It is also the 
well settled law that if the buyers desire to rescind the 
contract they must also do equity and return the considera-
tion. The uniform real estate contract under which the 
plaintiffs purchased the property provides for the sale of 
760 acres of land and the grazing permits for 30 head of 
cattle on 3400 acres of public lands under leases from the 
Bureau of Land Management (R. 4 & 5). The grazing rights 
were a substantial part of the contract, and during the 
time the plaintiff held possession of the property he de-
faulted in the payment of the grazing fees that were re-
quired to be paid under the terms of said contract, and 
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allowed the leases to become in default, and then secured 
the grazing permits in his own name, and offered to return 
the property to the defendants, keeping the grazing permits, 
a very substantial part of the value of the property sold; 
so that if the court should rescind the contract it could not 
put the parties in status quo, because of the willful fraud 
on the part of the plaintiff in permitting the permits to 
lapse and then taking them in his own name (R. 79). 
"Q. Did you ever receive the stated land leases 
in your own name? 
"A. No sir. 
"Q. Have they lapsed since, do you know? 
"A. They have. 
"Q. Where are they now? 
"A. The state land leases? 
"Q. Yes. 
"A. I have them. 
"Q. You picked them up in your own name, 
have you? 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. Why did you do that, Mr. Cole? 
"A. For my own protection." 
At the time of the execution of the contract, Mr. Cole 
paid the sum of $2,800 as the down payment, and the next 
payment in the amount of $8,800 was payable December 
31, 1952. Prior to the date of this payment Mr. Cole had 
discovered the alleged fraud (R. 106). 
"Q. Mr. Cole, it is stated here in the earnest 
money receipt that $2,800 was paid down on the 
contract and the next payment was due December 
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31, 1952 of $8,800. I will ask you if you made that 
payment of $8,800 in addition to this. 
"A. I made that payment under protest, yes 
sir. 
"Q. I will ask you whether or not you made 
an application in the fall of 1952 to the Soil Conser-
vation Service. 
"A. I did. I wrote the Soil Conservation Ser-
vice for assistance on what to do there after I found 
out my troubles that were confronting me there and 
getting that water down, when I did find out. 
"Q. Did anyone come in response to your ap-
plication? 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. Who was that? 
"A. Mr. Don Peterson and his fellow worker, 
I think Mr. Walker. 
"Q. What kind of assistance was contem-
plated? 
"A. They were-of course, it wasn't a new 
problem to Mr. Peterson. At that time he told me 
so. He says-
"Q. Don't tell me about that conversation, just 
what kind of assistance was contemplated. 
"A. They were going to help me conserve the 
water as near as they could. Work out the problems 
what would help on the water and also leveling 
and the ditching and that of the property that would 
be for the best interests of the ranch. 
"Q. Was there any feasible solution that was 
worked out for the water problems? 
"A. The only feasible solution that was worked 
out, if a person could have gone approximately five 
miles up the canyon from the ranch and put a cement 
ditch in all the way. 
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"Q. Were you quoted a price on that project? 
"A. Yes, the price would run anywhere from 
$20,000 to $27,000. 
"Q. Was anything done as a result of this ap-
plication? 
"A. Well, I tried at various places to get some 
assistance on that, but I just couldn't get to first 
base because they didn't seem to think that the ranch 
was worth the money that had to be spent on it to 
develop the water. It wasn't sure enough." 
By his own testimony Mr. Cole admitted that Mr. 
Peterson had made a survey of the work necessary to solve 
the water problem which had been discussed by the parties 
at the time the contract was signed, and had full informa.-
tion as to all of the facts concerning the water supply, and 
particularly the alleged hidden fault as testified to by Don 
Peterson, and the cost of the project and that the cost was 
prohibitive and financial assistance could not be obtained. 
All of this information was known to Mr. Cole before the 
payment of $8,800 was due on the 31st day of December, 
1952; and he had at that time made up his mind to rescind 
the contract. If Mr. Cole was going to rescind the contract, 
this was the time to have done so, at the time he had dis-
covered the alleged fraud and when he was in possession of 
all of the information concerning the ranch and the water 
supply. If Mr. Cole had elected to rescind the contract in 
the fall of 1952 after he had been advised by Don Peterson 
of all of the facts concerning the water supply and the cost 
of the necessary development work and at the time, by his 
own testimony, that he had determined to rescind the con-
tract, then there would have been little damage to either 
I :~ 
r:,· 
'·' 
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of the parties, and.the parties could have been put in status 
quo without a hardship on either of the parties. At that 
time, Mr. Cole had paid only the sum of $2,800, and under 
the testimony of Mr. Cole himself, practically all of that 
sum was derived from the sale of the crops on the place, 
(R. 78, 83), which were grown and ready for harvest at 
the time he entered into the contract. If a rescission had 
been made at that time, Mr. Parker could have either resold 
the ranches or rented them or farmed them himself and 
secured a crop for the year 1953. But instead of notifying 
Mr. Parker of his intention to rescind the contract when 
he had all of the information concerning the alleged fra?d 
and the water supply of the property, he elected to make 
the payment of $8,800 on December 31, 1952, "under pro-
test," as he termed it in his testimony, and continued to 
hold and occupy the property for another full year without 
making any effort to plant the ground into crops and per-
mitting the trees and premises to go to rack and ruin and 
deteriorate in value, thereby allowing the property to de-
preciate in value and depriving the Parkers of the oppor-
tunity of either selling the property or planting it to crops; 
while Cole speculated during the entire year trying 
to resell the property at a profit and in the mean-
time acquire in his own name the grazing rights for 
30 head of cattle on the public lands, which constituted a 
substantial part of the value of the property sold ; and then 
just before the payment was due on December 31, 1953 he 
cried fraud and elected to rescind the contract, but kept the 
grazing rights which he had secured in his own name, and 
demanded back all of the money paid, with interest. 
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The facts of this record clearly show that if the Parkers 
did misrepresent the water supply to the ranches, Mr. Cole, 
by his acts and conduct, had clearly waived the right to 
ask for rescission of the contract, and it would be grossly 
inequitable to permit the plaintiffs to keep the property 
for a whole year after the discovery of the alleged fraud, 
for the purpose of speculating on reselling the property 
without making an honest effort to cultivate and manage 
the property and to reduce the damages depriving the 
defendants of the opportunity of either planting the prop-
erty to crops or reselling it, and then keep the grazing 
rights for 30 head of cattle on 3400 acres of public lands 
which they fraudulently acquired after they had discovered 
the alleged fraud, but before they elected to rescind the 
contract. 
That the plaintiffs did completely abandon the property 
in the fall of 1952 after Don Peterson had made his survey 
of the property and the water supply for Mr. Cole was 
shown from the testimony of Mr. Cole himself (R. 69). 
"Q. What did you do in the way of work on 
the place after you moved on? 
"A. We finished harvesting the crops, the bar-
ley, finished the barley and put up the crop of hay 
and that was the end of it, and that was about all 
we did on the place. 
"Q. About how long was it you stayed at that 
time living on the place? 
"A. Well, we came on-I was probably on the 
place three months, two and a half. 
"Q. Where did you go after you moved off? 
"A. I moved back in the home I was building 
out here on 110th South. 
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"Q. What was your reason for moving back? 
"A. The biggest reason we moved back, the 
creek dried up entirely. I couldn't get any water for 
drinking and I was scart of the well water that was 
there. One big reason." 
This is the strongest evidence in the record to sustain 
the plaintiff's contention that he did not abandon the prop-
erty in the fall of 1952, after he had listed it for resale. 
Even if there was no water in the creek, as Mr. Cole testi-
fied, there was water in the well, which was admitted by 
Mr. Cole, but he was scared of it, without offering evidence 
that the water was not good. It was the same water as had 
been used by the defendants for many years. Mr. Cole ad-
mitted that he did not plow a furrow or plant a seed in the 
fall of 1952 (R. 69). Mr. Cole further testified that he at-
tempted to lease the property in the spring of 1953 to Bert 
Goff (R. 72 & 73), but that he didn't commence to work. 
Mr. George Sims, a nearby farmer, testified that he 
lives 17 miles from the Robinson and Meecham ranches, 
and that he goes by them frequently ( R. 171) ; that there 
was no attempt made on the part of the plaintiffs to do any 
work on the Robinson or Meecham ranches whatsoever in 
the spring of 1953 (R. 171, 172). Mr. Sims also testified 
that there was water on the ranches from Hendries Creek 
in 1953, but not quite as much as 1952 (R. 173). Mr. Sims 
also testified that there were crops raised on the neighbor-
ing farms for the year 1953, but they were not quite normal. 
The preponderance of the evidence clearly shows that after 
Mr. Cole had removed the crops from the place and had had 
~ the place examined by Mr. Don Peterson that he then de-
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termined to rescind the contract and thereafter made no 
effort to plant the ranches to crops and moved from and 
abandoned the property and was content to gamble during 
the entire following year on selling the property at a profit 
without making any effort to raise a crop and reduce the 
damages or rescind the contract and return the property 
to the defendants in order that they might reduce the dam-
ages by planting it to crops or reselling it. 
Counsel argues that the contract price for the ranches 
was the sum of $40,000 and that they were in fact only 
marginal ranches and not worth more than $20,000. Even 
if we should concede this, which we do not, the 
plaintiffs would not be entitled to rescind the con-
tract under the facts of this case because all of the losses 
that the plaintiffs suffered were occasioned by their own 
desire and election to hold the property for a year in an 
effort to resell the same at a profit and to secure the graz-
ing rights to 3400 acres of public lands for 30 head of cattle 
in their own names. Under all the facts of this case the 
return of the $11,600 paid on the contract by the plaintiffs 
is not unconscionable, while on the other hand it would be 
unconscionable on the part of this court to rescind the 
contract and return the consideration of $11,600 to the 
plaintiffs and permit them to keep the money paid on the 
contract from the sale of the crops which were ready for 
harvest at the time the sale was made, and also the grazing 
rights which the plaintiffs fraudulently acquired in their 
own names and after they had determined to rescind the 
contract, and which they did not at any time offer to return 
to the defendants. 
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The case at bar comes squarely and clearly within the 
rule laid down by this court in the case of Fraily vs. 
McGarry, 211 P. 2d 840, except that the case at bar is a 
much stronger case against rescission. In the Fraily vs. 
McGarry case the buyer vacillated for nine months after 
he had discovered that he could not obtain drilling permits 
from the Secretary of State's office in order to secure water 
for the place, thus deriving benefits under the contract for 
the period of nine months, before electing to rescind the 
contract. In the case at bar the plaintiffs not only vacillated 
for a period of ten months after they had learned of and 
discovered the alleged fraud, but a substantial part of the 
consideration paid by the plaintiffs was derived from the 
sale of crops already grown and on the place at the time 
of execution of the contract; and in the case at bar the 
failure on the part of the plaintiffs to rescind the contract 
. at the time of the discovery of the alleged fraud was the 
sole and only cause for all the loss that one of the parties 
must now suffer. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR AND WAS 
JUSTIFIED IN FORFEITING THE SUM OF 
$11,600.00 PAID ON THE CONTRACT BY THE 
PLAINTIFFS. 
Counsel argues that the contract was unconscionable. 
These were and had been producing ranches for many 
:years, on which the Parkers had lived and raised their 
·families (R. 195). Mr. Parker, after the usual farm 
deductions of interest, taxes, depreciation, labor and tak-
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ing his ten exemptions of $600 each, made an income 
of $1,200, which would make the gross income of $7,200 :~ 
from the Robinson ranch for the year 1951, the year prev-
ious to the sale to Mr. Cole (R. 220). ,, ~r. 
Counsel argues that it is unconscionable to permit Mr. 
Parker to keep the sum of $11,600 paid on the contract 
when the Coles were in possession of the property for only 
a year and five months. But at the time of the purchase _.. 
of the ranches by the Coles the ranches were planted into ~::: 
crops that were grown and ready for harvest, and were in 
fact harvested by the plaintiffs (R. 59). There is a dispute 
as to the value of the crops harvested by the plaintiffs, but 
from the obviously biased testimon~ of Mr. Cole he har- ~: .. 
vested barley in the sum of $1,498.22 (R. 78) and sold hogs 
for the sum of $343.12 (R. 83). Mr. Cole testified that 
there were about 60 acres of alfalfa which he harvested (R. 
59). Mr. Parker testified that there was about 40 or 50 
tons of alfalfa baled hay in addition to the first crop, and r~ 
that the value was about $20 per ton (R. 207), making the 
total value of the hay at least $800, not considering the '' 
value of the first crop on which there are no figures as to 
value or amount; so that at the very least $2,641 of the 
$11,600 paid by the plaintiffs was paid out of the crops 
that were on the place at the time of the sale to the Coles, 
and the plaintiffs have the grazing rights to 3400 acres of 
public lands, on which there is no evidence as to value. 
Counsel states that the Perkins case (Perkins vs. Spen-
cer, 243 P. 2d 446) sets forth the elements of damages which , 
the defendants are entitled to keep: 
"1. Loss of an advantageous bargain; 
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"2. Any damage or depreciation of the prop-
erty. 
"3. Any decline in value due to change in mar-
ket value of the property not allowed in items Nos. 
1 and 2; 
"4. For the fair rental value during the period 
of occupancy." 
Under the facts in this case, the defendants are entitled 
. to keep the total sum of $11,600 paid by the plaintiffs. The 
• contract contained the usual forfeiture clause in the Uni-
. form Real Estate Contract ( R. 4, 5), and this court is com-
~ mitted to the doctrine that the forfeiture clause of a contract 
• is enforceable if it does not amount to a penalty and was 
. a fair and honest effort to determine the damages, depend-
: ing upon the facts of each case. In the case of Christy vs. 
Guild et ux., 121 P. 2d 401, this court said: 
"Assuming that such an issue may be properly 
raised in an action such as this, we must conclude 
that the forfeiture provision of the contract is just 
what it purports to be, and not a penalty. The con-
tract provides for a down payment, the monthly 
installment to be made was $20 per month for the 
first 6 months and $30 per month from then on until 
the entire sum had been paid. While the appellant 
offered to prove that $2,000 worth of improvements 
had been made on the premises, such proof would 
not add to their cause since it was admitted that the 
net monthly income from the premises, such proof 
would not add to their cause since it was admitted 
that the net monthly income from the premises was 
$75.00. Such monthly income would more than com-
pensate for the improvements to the premises plus 
the monthly installments." 
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In this case this court clearly upholds the principle that 
this court will enforce the forfeiture provision of a uniform 
real estate contract as liquidated damages stipulated to if 
they do not amount to a penalty. The correct rule as to 
whether a forfeiture provision in a uniform real estate 
contract amounts to a penalty or is in fact liquidated dam-
ages is stated by Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition, 
Section 7, P. 1921 as follows, and was cited with approval 
in the Perkins vs. Spencer case by this court: 
"In spite of the language of the parties, there 
is little doubt that a sum named as liquidated dam-
ages in order to be given effect must be reasonable 
in amount. In the recent decisions of the most 
authoritative courts the primary question seems to 
be whether the parties honestly endeavored to fix 
a sum equivalent to the breach. This court says in 
other words, the reasonableness or unreasonableness 
of the stipulation is decisive." 
1,he same rule is also set forth in Section 339 of the Restate-
ment of Contracts, dealing with the question of whether a 
forfeiture provision is liquidated damages or a penalty, and 
was also cited by this court with approval in the Perkim 
vs. Spencer case, and is as follows: 
"(1) An agreement made in advance of breach 
fixing the damages therefore is not enforceable as a 
contract and does not affect the damages recover-
able for the breach unless 
"(a) The amount so fixed is a reasonable 
forecast of just compensation for the harm that 
is done by the breach and 
"(b) The harm that is caused by the 
breach is one that is incapable or very difficult 
of accurate estimation." 
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Applying this rule as stated in the Restatement of the 
Law of Contracts, quoted above and cited with approval 
by this court in the Perkins vs. Spencer case, to the facts 
of the case at bar, it becomes apparent that the forfeiture 
clause meets both the requirements (a) and (b) and is 
true liquidated damages. Mr. Cole purchased 720 acres of 
land, 135 acres of which was planted to crops, as testified 
·to by Mr. Cole (R. 59) and 250 acres as stated by Mr. 
Parker (R. 198), which crops were ready for harvest; 
. together with the grazing rights for 30 head of cattle on 
3400 acres of public lands (R. 4, 5) for the sum of 
~ $40,000.00. There were two homes on the property, and 
. two orchards, both bearing fruit. The contract provided for 
c the sum of $2,800 down payment and the further sum of 
1 $8,800 to be paid on or before the 31st day of December, 
, 1952; making a total sum of $11,600 to be paid on or before 
December 31, 1952 (R. 4, 5). No further payments were 
:to be paid until the 31st day of December, 1953. The ele-
.. ments of damage that were reasonably forseeable by the 
parties and which were attempted to be fixed by the parties 
, as liquidated damages were as follows: 
The amount and value of the crops then on the place 
were uncertain both as to the amount and the value. Mr. 
·Parker testified that there were approximately 1,300 bags 
r: of grain of 90 pounds each, and that he took five tons, leav-
ing 1,070 bags sold by Mr. Cole at $2.50 per bag, for a total 
iValue of $2,140 (R. 205). Mr. Cole testified that he had 
r:sold only $1,492.22 worth of barley. Mr. Cole also testified 
.. (R. 98-99) that there were 
"I don't know how many bags of oats I took off, 
or barley, I should say. The wheat-there was a 
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pretty fair crop of wheat but by the time I got out 
there was no wheat for me. Mr. Parker informed me 
the wheat had been stolen and it apparently had 
because it wasn't around the place, and apparently 
the same thing happened to the biggest part of the 
oats." 
There was also 45 to 50 tons of second crop of hay 
valued at $20.00 per ton, and the first crop hay that was 
then in the stacks, the exact amount of which is unknown 
to the parties (R. 207). There was also 15 acres of corn 
to be harvested (R. 59). There were also two orchards of 
fruit. It is perfectly apparent that at the time this contract 
was entered into the damages in case of a breach would be 
very difficult if not entirely impossible to ascertain, and 
the facts of this case come squarely within the scope and 
purpose of liquidated damages as stated in requirement (b) 
as set forth in the Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 
Section 339. The damages were difficult, if not impossible, 
to ascertain. 
Now were the damages which the parties forfeited in 
case of a breach in this case so disproportionate to the dam-
ages suffered by the defendants as to constitute a penalty? 
We think not. The defendants have suffered the following 
damages because of the breach of contract by the plaintiffs 
and the return of the property: 
1. Payment of a real estate commission in the sum 
of $2,800.00. 
2. Interest from the 21st day of August to December 
31, 1953, in the sum of $3,255.00. 
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3. Taxes for the year 1953 in the sum of $164.15 (R. 
212). 
4. Grazing fees in the sum of $43.20 (R. 93). 
The foregoing items make a total of $6,262.35 which 
. the parties could actually foresee and determine would be 
· the actual damages to the defendants in case the contract 
: was breached on the 31st day of December, 1953, the date 
~ it was actually breached. In addition to these items, the 
.: parties could reasonably foresee that the defendants would 
i be damaged to the extent of the crops then on the place, 
ii which were harvested and sold by the Coles. Mr. Cole ad-
·. mitted that he sold barley for the sum of $1,498.22 (R. 78) 
~and pigs for $343.12 (R. 83). When this sum is added to 
! the foregoing items it makes a total of damages to the de-
~~ fendants of $8,092.37, which does not take into considera-
, tion the wheat and oats which were on the property at the 
::time the property was turned over to the plaintiffs but 
which were stolen after the execution of the contract and 
:r before the Coles got around to taking possession, nor the 
40 to 50 tons of baled hay valued at $20.00 per ton for a 
·~total sum of $800.00 (R. 207). The total actual foreseeable 
:.~damages suffered by the defendants is the sum of $8,897.37, 
~as established by the preponderance of the evidence, not 
including the wheat and oats that were stolen. When this 
sum is deducted from the sum of $11,600 paid by the plain-
tiffs, this leaves the sum of $2,702.63 with which to com-
pensate the Parkers for the crop that they should have 
vraised on the ranches for the year 1953 and for the deprec-
iation on the two houses and the property and the two 
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orchards and the loss of grazing rights for 30 head of cattle 
on 3400 acres of public land. How can it be said that under 
all of the facts of this case that the forfeiture by the plain-
tiffs of $11,600 was disproportionate to the actual damages 
suffered by the Parkers and amounts to a penalty? We 
think it cannot. It appears to be an honest and fair attempt 
to fix in advance and determine the damages in case of a 
breach in a situation where part of the damages were read-
ily ascertainable and could be computed with certainty, but 
where a major part of the damages, that is, the value of the 
crops to be harvested and the crops to be grown the fol-
lowing year, the depreciation, and the loss of the grazing 
rights were not capable of accurate ascertainment by the 
parties stipulating to these elements of damages, and cer-
tainly under the facts of this case they were not dispro-
portionate to the actual damages suffered and were cer-
tainly proper elements of damage for the parties to attempt 
to fix in advance as liquidated damages. 
This court is committed to the doctrine that the for· 
feiture clause in such a contract will be enforced if it is a 
reasonable attempt to fix in advance the damages suffered : 
and is not disproportionate to the value of the damages ac· 
tually suffered. In Bramwell Investment Co. vs. Uggla 
et ux., (Utah), 16 P. 2d 913 this court said: 
"This court is committed to the doctrine that 
where the parties to a contract stipulate the amount: 
of liquidated damages that shall be paid in case of 
a breach, such a stipulation is as a general rule en· 
forceable if the amount stipulated is not dispropor· 
tionate to the damage actually sustained." 
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The case of Perkins vs. Spencer does not limit the 
damages recoverable to the items mentioned in this case, 
and this court does not in the Perkins vs. Spencer case 
depart from the long established rule in this jurisdiction 
that the court will enforce the provision for liquidated 
damages if the amount determined as liquidated damages 
in the case of breach is not disproportionate to the damage 
actually sustained. This court in the Perkins vs. Spencer 
case again reaffirms the long established doctrine in this 
court that the forfeiture provision as liquidated damage 
will be enforced if the amount stipulated to is not dispro-
portionate to the damage actually suffered. In this case 
this court again uses the following language : 
"This court is committed to the doctrine that 
where the parties to a contract have stipulated to 
the amount of liquidated damages that may be paid 
in case of breach, such stipulation is as a rule en-
forceable if the amount stipulated is not dispropor-
tionate to the damage actually suffered." 
That this court did not intend in the Perkins vs. Spencer 
case to depart from this doctrine is clearly shown from 
the following language of the court ( P. 451) . 
"We hold that under the facts of this case the 
forfeiture provision amounted to a penalty, which 
is unenforceable. Defendant contends that to so 
rule nullifies their contract and leaves them no other 
recourse than they would have had if no such pro-
vision had been included. It is true that this should 
be done only with the greatest reluctance, and when 
the facts clearly demonstrate that it would have been 
unconscionable to decree enforcement of the terms 
of the contract. This is such a case." 
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Under the facts of the Perkins vs. Spencer case the 
amount forfeited was in fact a penalty and bore no reason-
able relationship to the damages actually suffered. But 
under the facts of the case at bar the amount of the for-
feiture clearly bears a reasonable relationship to the actual 
damages suffered. In the Perkins vs. Spencer case there 
was a down payment of $2,500 on a sale of property for 
$10,500. In this respect the contract in this case was similar 
to the contract in the case at bar. The down payment was 
substantially 25% of the purchase price. In the case at bar 
the $11,600 was substantially the same, 25% down. In the 
Perkins vs. Spencer case the contract provided for payments 
of $75 per month, which the court found to be sufficient 
to compensate the seller for the interest, depreciation, etc., 
and the return of the $2,500 paid as a down payment was 
clearly a penalty and bore no reasonable relationship to the 
actual damages suffered. But the facts of the case at bar 
are entirely different. The contract was executed on the 
13th day of August, 1952 for the sum of $40,000; payable 
$2,800 down and $8,800 on or before the 31st day of De-
cember, 1952. This was a sale of two ranches comprising 
710 acres of ground, and grazing rights on 3400 acres of 
public land (R. 4, 5). At the time of the sale the ranches 
were planted to crops and they were about to be harvested, 
and were in fact harvested by the plaintiffs. The value of 
the crops was uncertain and difficult of ascertainment but 
was in fact a substantial part of the consideration paid to 
the defendant by the plaintiff. In other words, a substan· 
tial part of the money paid on the contract was deriverl 
from crops on the property at the time of the sale. Ther1 
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were no monthly payments on the contract to provide for 
interest and rental value, as there were in the case of 
Perkins v. Spencer. In the Perkins case the contract con-
. tern plated termination in a few months, as soon as the 
Bountiful property was sold, and the $75 per month pay-
ment was sufficient to pay the interest, taxes and rental. 
'There was no evidence that the seller had sustained any 
loss in the way of payment of a real estate commission, so 
. that the forfeiture of 25% down payment was clearly a 
. penalty; but under the facts of the case at bar the 25% 
paid down does not amount to a penalty, but represents a 
:reasonable and honest attempt to fix the damages and the 
:amount of the forfeiture is not disproportionate to the 
:actual damages suffered. 
We do not believe that the court in the Perkins vs. 
:Spencer case intended to limit the amount of the damages 
:the vendor could recover to the specific items mentioned 
in the opinion, Nos. 1 to 4, P. 451-452, but under the facts 
:of that case the seller was limited to these elements of 
damage. That the court did not in that case intend to limit 
:the damage of the vendor in such cases to the specific items 
~mentioned is clearly indicated by the language of the court 
:in the cases cited by the court in its opinion. This court 
;said in the Perkins vs. Spencer case: 
"When the contract provision is unenforceable 
the only way the rights of the parties can be ad-
justed is in the case of damages ordinarily recover-
able for such breach of contract, and citing Malm-
berg vs. Baugh, and in the case of Malmberg vs. 
Baugh this court said: 
"'Having elected to terminate the contract and 
resume possession of the property the vendor under 
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the rule we have invoked is entitled only to com-
pensatory damages measurable by the difference 
between the contract price of the land with interest 
and its value at the time he terminates the contract 
and elects to resume possession of the property, less 
payments made thereon by the vendee. Upon the 
most casual analysis it will be found that this rule 
secures the vendor the full benefit of his contract 
and in the opinion of the court, this is all he is en-
titled to under the law. If there are any damages 
in the case not covered by the above rule, they have 
not been made to appear.' " 
The language of the court clearly shows its intention not 
to deprive the vendor of such actual damages (not punitive) 
as the vendor shall actually sustain because of the breach. 
But in the case of Malmberg vs. Baugh, 218 P. 975 just 
referred to, that was the only element of damage shown, 
and in the case of Perkins vs. Spencer those elements of 
damage enumerated by the court were the only elements 
of damage shown. But in the case at bar the defendants i 
have shown the following items of compensatory damages 
to which they are justly entitled, in the event that this court 
does not enforce the forfeiture provision of the contract 
as liquidated damages: 
1. A real estate commision in the sum of $2,800 which 
was entirely lost to the defendants when the plaintiffs de-
faulted in their contract. 
2. The value of the crops on the ranch at the time of 
the execution of the contract, as admitted by Mr. Cole in 
the sum of $1,840.30, and a 1nuch greater sum as testified 
to by Mr. Parker. 
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3. Interest in the sum of $3,255.00. 
4. Taxes for the year 1953 in the sum of $164.15. 
5. Grazing fees in the sum of $43.27, making a total 
mm of $8,102.65 in actual compensatory damages suffered 
.)y the defendants because of the failure of the plaintiff to 
'!omply with the terms of the contract as admitted by Mr. 
Jole himself and not including the hay as testified to by 
~r. Cole and the grain that was stolen. 
SUMMARY 
The facts clearly show that there was no fraud prac-
~;iced by the defendants upon the plaintiffs; that Mr. Cole 
nade an extended inspection of the property; that the 
r:ontract was entered into before harvest time, when the 
~rops were grown and ready for harvest; that Mr. Parker 
~howed the entire properties to the plaintiffs and after 
~riewing the ranches and seeing for himself the amount of 
:and under cultivation, the amount planted to crops and 
;:he productivity of the ranches, and also the amount of 
:vater reaching the ranch at that time, they then were taken 
c,y Mr. Parker to the source of Hendries Creek, the source 
1f the water supply for the ranches, and Mr. Cole saw for 
;rimself that the major part of the water was being lost 
!Y percolation before it reached the ranches. That there 
\Tas at that time a discussion between :r.1:r. Cole, Mr. Crystal, 
tfr. Hancock and Mr. Parker concerning the ways and 
neans of preventing the loss of the water by percolation 
.nd Mr. Cole understood the true condition of the water 
;upply and the necessary development work that would be 
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required in order to secure a stable water supply for the 
ranches. 
That soon after the purchase of the property, Mr. Cole 
had Mr. Don Peterson make a survey of the ranches and 
the water supply, and Mr. Don Peterson advised Mr. Cole 
early in the fall of 1952 as to the nature of the water supply 
and the development program necessary to conserve the 
water. Mr. Cole attempted in the fall of 1952 to secure 
aid in the development of the water, but was unable to do 
so because of the prohibitive cost. Then, after securing all 
of the information concerning the ranches and the water 
supply he made up his mind in the fall of 1952 that he would 
rescind the contract, but instead of notifying the defen· 
dants of his intention to rescind the contract in the fall 
of 1952 when he knew all of the facts, he elected to make the 
payment due on the contract on the 31st day of December, 
1952 in the sum of $8,800 under protest, as he termed it, 
and did then abandon the property and failed to plant the 
property to crops and held possession in an effort to try 
to sell the property at a profit, until December 1, 1953, 
when he served notice of his intention to rescind the con· 
tract. 
It is earnestly urged that under the facts of this case 
the court did not err in finding that the defendants had 
made no fraudulent representations and that under the 
facts of this case the plaintiffs were not entitled to rescind 
the contract, and that the defendants were entitled to keep 
the full sum of $11,600 paid by the plaintiffs as liquidated 
damages for the breach of the contract. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
35 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants respectfully submit that the trial court's 
decree was not based upon a hard-hearted view of the law 
and a total disregard of equitable principles as stated by 
the plaintiffs in the conclusion of their brief, but that the 
decree of the court is based upon the soundest principles 
of law and equity. We submit that under the facts of this 
case all of the loss that the plaintiffs must now suffer was 
caused solely by the intentional misconduct of the plaintiffs 
in this case after they had discovered all of the facts con-
! cerning the alleged fraud of the defendants and while they 
were holding the property from December 31, 1952 to De-
cember 1, 1953, while they were attempting to resell the 
: property at a profit rather than return the property to the 
~ defendants in order that they might resell the same or plant 
~ it to crops and thereby reduce the damages to be suffered. 
~ It is not a harsh ruling of the court nor a harsh rule of law 
:·. that requires the plaintiffs to assume the damages that are 
: occasioned solely by their own intentional misconduct. In 
. this case the plaintiffs would have suffered no damages 
: whatsoever if they had elected to rescind the contract in 
the fall of 1952 after they had discovered the alleged fraud, 
; because at that time they had received from the sale of the 
crops all of the $2,800 which they had made as the original ~ down payment, and if a rescission had been made at that 
time there would have been no substantial losses to either 
of the parties. Under the facts of this case equity requires 
,._ that this court find that the sum of $11,600 forfeited by the 
-. plaintiffs was a fair and reasonable effort to fix the amount 
of liquidated damages where the damages were in truth and 
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in fact very uncertain, and that the damages suffered by 
the defendants were not disproportionate to the amount 
fixed by the parties as liquidated damages, and the for-
feiture clause of this contract should be upheld by this 
court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAYMOND R. BRADY and 
DEAN E. FLANDERS, 
Counsel for Respondent8. 
616 Judge Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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